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Covid-19:  The road To equiTy and solidariTy
Explaining covid-19 performance: what factors 
might predict national responses?
Fran Baum and colleagues discuss the factors that affected prediction of the success of national 
responses to covid-19 and will influence future pandemic preparedness
Covid-19 has exposed and exac-erbated existing flaws in pub-lic health systems around the world. Shredded social safety nets and underinvestment in 
healthcare systems, compounded by con-
flicts of interest, dismissal of scientific evi-
dence, and failures of political leadership 
meant many countries were unprepared to 
deal with the covid-19 pandemic and vul-
nerable to the next one. Important lessons 
can be learnt from the various national 
responses to covid-19 to inform prepared-
ness for future waves or the emergence of 
new pandemics or epidemics
The Global Health Security Index 
(GHSI), which measures preparedness 
for pandemics or epidemics, published 
its scores in October 2019, just before the 
covid-19 pandemic was declared.1 The US 
and UK scored highest on the GSHI, but 
both countries have done spectacularly 
badly in response to covid-19, whether 
measured in deaths or economic damage. 
The Epidemic Preparedness Index,2 also 
published in 2019, grouped countries 
into five levels of preparedness, and also 
placed the US and the UK and others 
that have fared poorly in the covid-19 
pandemic in the highest categories. The 
GHSI and the Epidemic Preparedness 
Index are the only pandemic preparedness 
indices that cover most countries and thus 
enable cross country risk assessment. 
However, both failed to predict national 
covid-19 preparedness. To understand 
how to assess pandemic preparedness 
more accurately, we specifically focus on 
the GHSI because it includes a wide range 
of measures and comprehensive country 
data collection.3
The GHSI takes account of qualitative 
and quantitative data intended to measure 
the capacity of 195 countries to deal with 
disease outbreaks. Based on an expert 
assessment of structures and processes, 
the GHSI includes indicators related to 
geopolitical considerations, national 
healthcare capacity, and political and 
economic risk factors. It assesses countries 
using 140 questions across six domains: 
prevention, detection and reporting, 
response, health system, compliance 
with norms, and risk of infectious disease 
outbreaks. Scores range from 0 to 100, 
and a higher GHSI score indicates better 
preparedness.
The 2019 GHSI report provided prophetic 
recommendations for “a fast-spreading 
respiratory disease agent that could have 
a geographic scope, severity, or societal 
impact and could overwhelm national or 
international capacity to manage it.”1 The 
authors described “severe weaknesses in 
country abilities to prevent, detect, and 
respond to health emergencies; severe 
gaps in health systems; vulnerabilities 
to  pol i t ical ,  socioeconomic,  and 
environmental risks that can confound 
outbreak preparedness and response; 
and a lack of adherence to international 
norms.”1 The average overall GHSI score 
for the 195 countries assessed was 40.2 
out of 100, and 51.9 for the 60 high income 
countries. Less than 7% of countries scored 
in the highest tier for ability to prevent the 
emergence or release of pathogens, and less 
than 5% of countries scored in the highest 
tier for ability to respond rapidly to and 
mitigate epidemic spread.1
After the US and UK, the Netherlands, 
Australia, Canada, Thailand, Sweden, 
Denmark, South Korea, and Finland were 
the highest scoring countries on the GHSI. 
A higher GHSI score would be expected 
to be associated with lower measures 
of covid-19 burden. However, the GHSI 
was much less accurate when assessing 
individual countries. In April 2020 the 
GHSI score was positively associated with 
covid-19 cases and deaths, but not related 
to covid-19 testing rate. As at 19 October 
2020, national cumulative death rates from 
covid-19 were positively related to GHSI 
score (r=0.35, P<0.001), indicating the 
persistence of the association (fig 1).
Why didn’t the GHSI predict national 
performance more accurately?
We propose 10 factors that may account 
for the failure of the GHSI to predict per-
formance in the covid-19 pandemic and 
provide guidance for the development of a 
new index on preparedness.
Limited consideration of globalisation, 
geography, and global governance
The GSHI measures the performance of 
individual nations. However, given the 
increasingly globalised and intercon-
nected social and economic world, viruses 
can spread rapidly despite seemingly good 
preparedness. The GHSI did not consider 
the importance of geography. For exam-
ple, islands nations such as Australia, 
New Zealand, and Pacific island states 
could close their borders in an attempt to 
prevent the virus from entering the coun-
try. Major air transport hubs in particular 
posed risks for increased disease transmis-
sion. The GSHI also did not consider the 
contribution of regional organisations (eg 
the European Union) or global organisa-
tions (eg the G20) to coordinating national 
responses. Failure to coordinate efforts to 
stem the spread and impact of the virus 
has yielded considerable chaos, including 
shortages of critical commodities such as 
personal protective equipment, poorly 
managed population movements, and 
lack of standardisation of key trade poli-
cies. Thus, disease control may be only as 
effective as practices within the poorest 
performing countries.4
Key Messages
•   The Global Health Security Index pre-
dicted that the world in general was 
not well prepared for the pandemic 
but did not predict individual country 
preparedness
•   Ten factors seem to have contributed 
to the index failing to predict coun-
try responses, including overlooking 
political, economic, and social con-
texts and the role of civil society
•   Future assessments of pandemic 
preparedness need to take these 10 
factors into account by adopting a sys-
tems approach which enables a focus 
on critical system components
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Bias to high income countries
Researchers in US institutions developed 
the GHSI, advised by a panel of interna-
tional experts. Critics of the GHSI argued 
the experts’ emphasis on biosafety over 
other capacities reflects a bias to high 
income countries.4-6 For example, there 
is tension between biosecurity focused, 
authoritarian approaches to public health 
and more comprehensive, social deter-
minants driven, participatory and rights 
based approaches, which require effective 
community participation.7 The pandemic 
has highlighted the importance of the lat-
ter and the need to involve a broad range of 
experts from different backgrounds, includ-
ing civil society, to develop and implement 
an effective response to a public health 
crisis.
Failure to assess health system capacity
Nations with universal publicly funded 
health systems that were not financially 
distressed and had strong public health 
capacity seem to have been relatively 
well prepared for covid-19: these include 
Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, and New 
Zealand. Conversely, the pandemic high-
lighted the weaknesses of fragmented 
systems relying on for-profit healthcare 
providers, such as in the US. Covid-19 
exposed fragile and chronically under-
funded public health systems and weak 
pandemic preparedness activities. Eng-
land outsourced testing and tracing to 
private companies with no relevant expe-
rience, which created a fragmented sys-
tem separate from existing health service, 
university, and veterinary laboratories and 
from those experienced in contact tracing 
in local government or sexual health clin-
ics. The tracing system in particular per-
formed poorly, using a telephone based 
system that ignored the importance of the 
local knowledge of contact tracers, termed 
“shoe leather epidemiology.”8 The result 
was an ineffective and fragmented pro-
gramme which hampered efforts to control 
the outbreak. These factors also highlight 
the importance of being able to draw on 
a well functioning public health system.9 
Vietnam, whose public health system 
emphasises care, solidarity, and commu-
nity responsibility, has had low covid-19 
cases and death rates although it scored 
low on the GHSI (50th place; score 49.1).
Role of political leadership
The GHSI measures trust in government, 
but it overlooked the role that political 
leadership and ideology plays in shaping 
public health responses.10 The GHSI rated 
New Zealand lower than many other high 
income countries (35th place; score 54.0). 
Yet many praise Prime Minster Ardern’s 
strong political leadership during the 
covid-19 crisis, especially her empathic 
and clear communication to the public 
and evidence based response. By contrast, 
other leaders, including in the US and Bra-
zil, failed to accept scientific public health 
advice, including mask wearing and social 
distancing, promoted unproved therapies, 
and criticised the World Health Organi-
zation. In the UK, rated second highest 
on the GHSI, the covid-19 response was 
hampered by the process of leaving the 
European Union, which dominated the 
attention of politicians and efforts of civil 
servants.11 The perils of populist leaders in 
pandemic responses have been previously 
highlighted.12
Assessing political leadership and 
philosophy may risk politicising the index 
and opening it to criticism from countries 
with low scores. However, existing 
frameworks for assessing the quality of a 
country’s governance,13 effectiveness,14 
and transparency can be drawn on.15 
Examples of poor governance during 
covid-19 include the growing concern 
about corruption in the procurement of 
essential equipment and the absence 
of transparency when contracting with 
private companies.16 Given the vital 
importance of trust during a pandemic, 
political leaders who promote transparent 
government are more likely to mount a 
more effective response.
Importance of context overlooked 
Consideration of context is key to the accu-
rate assessment of health interventions.17  18 
Yet to allow for cross country comparisons, 
indices often reduce complex systems to a 
standard set of measures that overlook 
important differences, such as dynamic 
political, economic, and social structures 
and systems6
The context can include the degree of 
centralisation of power. New Zealand and 
Vietnam have centralised governments, 
and both fared well in response to covid-19. 
Some federated states including India, the 
US, Belgium, Australia, and South Africa 
have pandemic responses that have varied 
in effectiveness across the country and 
point to the value of national coordination. 
Italy’s regional structure allowed it to 
largely contain the pandemic in the north 
of the country during the first wave.19 
However, this containment broke down in 
the summer as Italians went on holiday20 
and exposed weaknesses in the regional 
health infrastructure and preparedness in 
regions that had escaped the initial wave.21 
Future predictive work would benefit 
from a qualitative, context assessment 
of each country, informed by a range of 
expertise.
Limits of national wealth as predictive factor
The GHSI report noted a positive corre-
lation between gross domestic product 
(GDP) (0.37) and GDP per capita (0.44) 
and the GHSI score.1 But national wealth 
may not be the only or main determinant 
of health security. Lower income countries 
may allocate their scarce resources more 
appropriately and tailored to context.5 6 
In Rwanda, a strong health system, rapid 
lockdown, and effective contact testing 
and testing of staff at national borders and 
those working in public spaces, such as 
banks and bars, have kept cases low and 
no deaths have been recorded.22 Similarly, 
despite Vietnam’s low GDP it has had a 
highly effective pandemic response. Such 
outcomes confirm earlier analyses that low 
income countries can use their resources 
efficiently and innovatively to achieve 
good health.23
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Fig 1 | Relation between Global Health Security Index score and number of covid-19 deaths up 
to 19 October 2020 (Our World in Data: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus)1
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No examination of inequalities within 
countries
The covid-19 pandemic has heightened 
pre-existing inequalities in many countries. 
Most nations reported minority populations 
being most vulnerable. In the US, black, 
Hispanic, and Native American people 
were more susceptible to infection, severe 
illness, hospitalisation, and death.24-26 
In Australia, recently arrived migrants 
faced greater risk,27 while minority ethnic 
groups bore a high burden in the UK.28 In 
South Africa most infection hot spots arose 
in high density, overcrowded settlements 
with poor access to water and other basic 
services and heavy reliance on cramped 
private taxi transport in the absence of any 
public transport.29 In Brazil, social inequi-
ties and structural racism placed pregnant 
and postpartum black women at higher risk 
of death.30 Everywhere, marginalised peo-
ple and those living in precarious situations 
tend to fall through the cracks in the social 
safety nets, find it harder to isolate when 
required, and cannot avoid settings where 
the risks of infection are high. Marginalised 
people also face the risk of losing their jobs 
and housing, fail to qualify for social secu-
rity, and face food insecurity. Future itera-
tions of the GHSI should include measures 
of the scale and nature of inequalities 
within a country.
Importance of social security provisions
The covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the 
importance of social security provisions to 
protect people from losing their jobs and 
homes, yet the GHSI does not consider 
them in its assessment. Government sup-
port to people and businesses affected by 
covid-19 has been important. For example, 
in many high income countries, unemploy-
ment benefits and job and income support 
schemes have protected many from extreme 
poverty, whereas in most low and middle 
income countries such income protection 
does not exist. In India the absence of gov-
ernment support forced tens of thousands 
of migrant workers to return to their home 
villages. Some died and many faced police 
harassment and hunger. In many countries 
the availability of sick leave has been an 
effective public health measure as peo-
ple without this provision have found it 
difficult to follow public health advice to 
self-isolate. Including measures of social 
protection would improve future indices.
Civil society capacity not assessed
The GHSI did not assess the capacity of civil 
society organisation to assist in pandemic 
responses. Social solidarity built on civil 
society engagement can offer protection 
even where trust in government is weak. 
For example, in South Africa, Cape Town’s 
community action networks are work-
ing to both ameliorate the consequences 
of lockdown and reduce local transmis-
sion. Using social media, they built local 
relationships based on trust and chal-
lenged divisive individualism by creating 
a collective consciousness for responses to 
covid-19 related issues.31 Societies can also 
create political space for civil society and 
social movement activists to protest human 
rights abuses, which often increase under 
the cover of exceptional or emergency pan-
demic measures.32 Future exercises should 
include civil society perspectives and their 
potential to respond to pandemics.
Gap between capacity and its application not 
assessed
Although the GHSI assessed the theoreti-
cal capacity of a country to respond to a 
pandemic it did not examine the actual 
capacity and willingness to respond. For 
example, the US scored high on applied 
epidemiology training programmes (indi-
cators 2.3.1) but political intervention pre-
vented the Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention from applying epidemiologi-
cal science to responses to the pandemic. 
A complex system is only as strong as its 
weakest point. Preparedness assessments 
based on system critical components dis-
cussed here work best.
Conclusion
The GHSI report accurately predicted that 
the world was not well prepared for a pan-
demic. However, the complex country 
responses to covid-19 and biases within 
the GHSI limited the accuracy of its predic-
tions for specific countries. To strengthen 
the predictive capabilities of global indices, 
a diverse team of experts should be used to 
assess the complex set of factors that shape 
a country’s capacity to respond.
Other vital indicators needed in future 
global indices to assess a country’s 
likely capacity for a robust response to a 
pandemic include the extent of inequities in 
a country, the strength of social protection 
and public health response capacity, 
the geographic context, and exposure to 
globalisation. Qualitative assessment of a 
country’s capacities in terms of its political 
leadership’s willingness to accept scientific 
advice and the strength of its civil society to 
protect human rights and foster trust is also 
important. Existing measures of corruption 
and trust should be used in future indices. 
The need for cross border cooperation 
and joint planning of future assessments 
of global pandemic preparedness point 
to the need to examine the capacity of 
supra-national organisations. The crucial 
lesson from the covid-19 pandemic is that 
an effective response does not rely just 
on a strong public health system but also 
requires a society that is fair and offers 
all its citizens and residents social and 
economic security.
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